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INTRODUCTION
The design immunity provided by California Government Code
section 830.6 exonerates a public entity from liability for injuries
caused by a reasonably approved plan or design of public property.'
* Girard Fisher, A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1967; J.D. University
of San Diego, 1973; M.A. California State University at Hayward, 1977, is a partner in
the Los Angeles firm of Fisher & Prager and represents public entities in litigation under
the California Government Tort Liability Act and federal civil rights acts.
1. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980). The complete text of this statute ap-
pears in the appendix to this Article.
Often asserted in roadway design cases, the immunity also applies to
injuries caused by the defective design of buildings, recreational fa-
cilities, and other improvements.2 The immunity reaches allegations
of defective design regardless of whether the liability arises out of
the California Tort Claims Act or other statutes.3
This Article, based on a review of every case decided since the
enactment of section 830.6 in 1963, provides a comprehensive discus-
sion of the steps necessary to prove design immunity. It covers the
following subjects: The elements of design immunity (§1), substan-
tial evidence of reasonable approval (§2), discretionary approval of
the plan, design, or standards prior to construction (§3), the causal
relationship between the plan and the accident (§4), notice that the
plan is dangerous in operation (§5), and the procedures for establish-
ing design immunity (§6).
1. The Essential Elements Of Design Immunity
The essential elements of design immunity are: (1) A causal rela-
tionship between the plan and the accident; (2) discretionary ap-
proval of the plan prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence
supporting reasonableness of the plan.4
In design immunity cases, the substantial evidence test may allow
public entities to easily establish the threshold element of reasona-
bleness. As explained in section two below, the substantial evidence
test requires such a low threshold of proof, that the testimony of a
public entity's expert witness will usually suffice to establish reasona-
bleness, often by summary judgment, and even if plaintiff presents
strong evidence to the contrary.
Although reasonableness may be easily established, several other
threshold elements can complicate proof of the design immunity in
vigorously contested cases. More specifically, a public entity must
establish the discretionary approval of the plan, and the causal rela-
tionship between the plan and the accident; and overcome the argu-
ment in almost every case that the public entity lost the immunity
2. See Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967)
(Overruled by Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1972)). See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.) (glass in doorway); Strongman
v. County of Kern, 255 Cal. App. 2d 308, 62 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1967) (concrete floating
dock at boat launching facility); Davis v. Cordova Recreation & Park Dist., 24 Cal. App.
3d 789, 101 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972) (artificial pond in park); Thomson v. City of Glen-
dale, 61 Cal. App. 3d 378, 132 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1976) (handrail on public walkway);
Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, 67 Cal. App. 3d 565, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1977) (improper
drainage).
3. Mikkelsen v. State, 59 Cal. App. 3d 621, 130 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1976) (action for
nuisance under CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479). However, it does not apply to condemnation.
Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
4. Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks, 65 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88-89, 135 Cal. Rptr.
127, 130-31 (1976).
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because it had actual or constructive notice that the plan was dan-
gerous in actual operation. The courts have treated these elements as
issues for the court to determine under the substantial evidence test.5
However, close reading of *section 830.6 suggests that the substantial
evidence test may apply only to the reasonableness element, and that
a jury must decide the remaining elements of design immunity on
the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. If so, the task of
proving the immunity will become more complicated.
2. Substantial Evidence Of Reasonable Approval
2.1 The "Substantial Evidence" Test
One feature of design immunity is the use of the substantial evi-
dence test to determine whether the public entity reasonably ap-
proved a plan, design or standards. "Substantial evidence," unde-
fined in the Government Code, refers to the test applied by appellate
courts in reviewing trial court judgments. Pursuant to that test, the
appellate courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable
for the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts of evidence in the pre-
vailing party's favor, and draw all favorable inferences that may be
drawn. The court may not re-weigh the evidence, and may not re-
verse judgment, even if it believes the evidence favors the losing
party.6 By incorporating the substantial evidence test into section
830.6, the legislature accorded all these advantages, normally re-
served for respondents in appellate proceedings, to public entities en-
deavoring to establish the reasonable approval of a plan at the trial
court level.
As a result of the substantial evidence test, the court, not a jury,
will decide the issue of reasonable approval. Furthermore, the public
entity need not establish this issue by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and summary judgment may be available to resolve the de-
sign immunity defense in the public entity's favor. In addition, re-
cent appellate decisions have liberally construed the substantial
evidence test to find reasonable approval even in the face of strong
5. A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 3.34
(1980 & Supp. 1990) (citing Cameron v. State, 7 Cal. 3d 318, 102 Cal. Rptr. 305
(1972) and Mozzetti, 67 Cal. 3d at 565, 497 P.2d 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 751).
6. See Freeman v. Lind, 181 Cal. App. 3d 791, 798-99, 226 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518-19
(1986); Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Cal. 3d 530, 544, 564 P.2d 857, 866, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 705, 714 (1977); and Albaugh v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 9 Cal. 2d 751, 773, 4
P.2d 574, 574 (1937).
testimony from plaintiffs' experts to the contrary.7
2.2 The Legislative Purpose Behind the Test
The legislative purpose for creating this low evidentiary threshold
was twofold. First, the legislature was reluctant to permit the courts
to intrude into the executive functions of government agencies. This
reluctance stemmed from a belief that reexamination of governmen-
tal decisions "would create too great a danger of impolitic interfer-
ence with the freedom of decision-making by those public officials in
whom the function of making such decisions has been vested." 8
The second purpose, expressed in the New York State appellate
decisions after which section 830.6 was patterned, was a reluctance
"to place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has seen fit to en-
trust to experts." 9 This conclusion, that planning and design func-
tions might exceed the ken of a jury10 seems surprising in view of the
fact that juries routinely decide complicated issues in cases involving
the private sector. Nevertheless, the California legislature clearly
elected to bar juries from reviewing design decisions when it enacted
section 830.6.
2.3 Application of the Substantial Evidence Test
Typically, the design immunity defense is tried on the basis of ex-
pert testimony; the public entity's expert attests to the reasonable-
ness of the design and the plaintiff's expert opines to the contrary.
Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to weigh these conflict-
ing opinions in an effort to determine the reasonableness of the de-
sign." However, recent cases have infused new life into section 830.6
7. Muffett v. Royster, 147 Cal. App. 3d 289, 195 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1983) (nonsuit
in favor of state); Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach, 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1987) (reversal of judgment for plaintiff and entry of new judgment in favor
of city on design immunity defense); Hefner v. County of Sacramento, 197 Cal. App. 3d
1007, 243 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1988) (summary judgment in favor of county).
8. RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 4 CALIF. L. REV'N
COMM'N at 823 (1963) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
9. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 167 N.E.2d 63, 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 413
(1960) (cited in RECOMMENDATION at 851).
10. Weiss, 7 N.Y.2d at 586, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14. Further:
To state the matter briefly, absent some indication that due care was not exer-
cised in the preparation of the design or that no reasonable official could have
adopted it-and there is no indication of either here--we perceive no basis for
preferring the jury verdict, as to the reasonableness of the "clearance interval"[i.e. the timing of phases of a traffic light], to that of the legally authorized
body which made the determination in the first instance. Indeed, as we read
the lengthy and involved body of testimony before the jury, there is ample basis
for doubting that body's capacity to arrive at a conclusion as to the "clearance
intervals'" reasonableness.
11. E.g., Davis v. Cordova Recreation & Park Dist., 24 Cal. App. 3d 789, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1972); Levin v. State, 146 Cal. App. 3d 410, 194 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1983).
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by emphasizing that once the public entity has established "any"
substantial evidence of reasonable approval, the court may not weigh
conflicting evidence that would tend to show that the design was un-
reasonable. 12 Put another way, the court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the public employees responsible for approving
the plans on the issue of reasonableness."
Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach14 provides practical guidance
for establishing "substantial evidence" of reasonable approval. It is
generally sufficient to establish reasonable approval if a public en-
tity's legislative body relies on the advice of a competent engineer,
whether from a reputable private traffic engineering firm, or from
the public entity's staff. Further, once the testimony of a public en-
tity's engineering expert establishes substantial evidence of the plan's
reasonableness, the plaintiff cannot defeat the immunity simply by
providing expert testimony to the contrary. The court observed,
we read section 830.6 to mean that as long as reasonable minds can differ
concerning whether a design should have been approved, then the govern-
mental entity must be granted immunity .... A mere conflict in the testi-
mony of expert witnesses provides no justification for the matter to go to a
lay jury.15
Another basis for establishing reasonableness is proof that the de-
sign conformed to established engineering standards. In Moritz v.
City of Santa Clara,16 the city established the design immunity by
proving that a crosswalk followed a standard pattern used through-
out the state, complied with Vehicle Code section 21368 and con-
formed to the Cal Trans Traffic Manual."' The court stated that: "a
design which clearly comports with the provisions of the Vehicle
12. Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach, 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 526, 237 Cal. Rptr.
505, 512-13 (1987); Hefner v. County of Sacramento, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 1013-14,
243 Cal. Rptr. 291, 294 (1988); Muffett v. Royster, 147 Cal. App. 3d 289, 306-07, 195
Cal. Rptr. 73, 83 (1983).
13. The recent change in attitude toward the substantial evidence rule is illustrated
by the seemingly inconsistent decisions in Levin, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 233 (decided before Ramirez) and Hefner, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
291 (decided after Ramirez). In both cases, William Neuman, a professor of civil engi-
neering, testified for the plaintiffs; in both cases Neuman criticized the public entities'
engineers for failing to conduct a comprehensive "engineering evaluation" before imple-
menting the design and for violating their own written standards. The Levin court re-
versed summary judgment for the state, but the Hefner court affirmed the motion for
summary judgment for the County of Sacramento, despite the similar approach of plain-
tiffs and their expert in both cases.
14. 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 237 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1987).
15. Id. at 525, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
16. 8 Cal. App. 3d 573, 87 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1970).
17. Id. at 575, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
Code and also with the specifications of the Division of Highways
certainly meets this [substantial evidence] test."' 18
Importantly, the standard of reasonableness is not retrospective;
instead, section 830.6 requires only that a reasonable employee or
body could have adopted the plan or design, or the standards, at the
time of approval. Therefore the immunity does not dissipate with the
passage of time even if design standards have become more
stringent.19
A collateral rule in defining reasonableness is that improvements
made after an accident cannot be admitted into evidence to show
that the original design was unreasonable. Such evidence is inadmis-
sible because the issue in design immunity is not whether a better
plan is available; rather, the issue is whether the public entity could
have reasonably approved the plan at the time of original approval. 20
For this reason, the court in Moritz refused to overturn a motion for
summary judgment on the basis of evidence that the City posted
warning signs after an accident. The court observed that evidence of
signs
at best would create a conflict with the substantial evidence of reasonable-
ness of the design.... It is not necessary for the court to withhold summaryjudgment whenever subsequent improvements are made because of the pos-
sibility that a particular witness may be called for the defense and may be
subject to cross-examination which, even if successful, would not destroy
the "design defense" which has been enacted by statute.21
Some trial court judges will continue to have difficulty in applying
the substantial evidence test because it contains the troublesome im-
plication that once a public entity submits the favorable testimony of
a paid expert, no amount of contrary evidence can defeat the immu-
nity. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of "reasonableness," a plaintiff must introduce not only conflicting
expert testimony, but also persuade the court that the public entity's
expert testimony is inherently unbelievable.22 Consequently, this lim-
18. Id. at 577, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 677. See also, Hefner, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 243
Cal. Rptr. 291, Pfeifer v. County of San Joaquin, 67 Cal. 2d 177, 430 P.2d 51, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1967).
19. In Thomson v. City of Glendale, the court observed, with respect to the design
of a handrail, "[T]he fact that the [then applicable] 1973 Uniform Building Code was
changed and that the construction in question did not conform to the new standards, does
not establish the existence of a dangerous condition." 61 Cal. App. 3d 378, 387, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 52, 58 (1976).
20. See, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.5(a) (West 1980) and CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151
(West 1966) (barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures).
21. Moritz, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 577-78, 87 Cal.Rptr. at 678.
22. In determining whether the evidence is persuasive, the question is whether the
public entity has adduced facts that "reasonably [inspire] confidence" and are of "solid
value." Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach, 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 526, 237 Cal. Rptr.
505, 512-13, citing Davis v. Cordova Recreation & Park Dist., 24 Cal. App. 3d at 789,
798, 101 Cal. Rptr. 358, 364. In some cases, "appellate courts have rejected expert testi-
mony ostensibly supporting design immunity where the testimony has been flawed suffi-
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itation confines plaintiffs to a very small playing field when arguing
against the "reasonableness" of government approval.
3. Discretionary Approval Of The Plan Before Construction
3.1 The Existence of an "Approval"
Government Code section 830.6 requires that a legislative body of
the public entity or "some other body or employee exercising discre-
tionary authority" give advance approval of the plan, design, or stan-
dards.3 The first step in satisfying this element is to document the
existence of an "approval." On major construction projects the pro-
cess of approval is obvious because it culminates in a public entity's
engineer's submission of plans and specifications to the legislative
body for a vote of approval. The result will be documented in the
minutes and agenda material, which may contain the engineer's
written recommendation and the plans and specifications. Alterna-
tively, the public entity engineer may have stamped or signed the
plans as approved.
However, in many cases, neatly packaged proof of approval is not
available. Legislative bodies are not always involved in the approval
of important design features. For example, placement of traffic regu-
latory signs and pavement markings are often determined by some-
one other than the legislative body. Anyone from the Public Works
Director, down to the Maintenance Supervisor, may make the deci-
sion. Frequently, documentation of the decision is sparse or alto-
gether missing. However, section 830.6 does not specify that a plan
must be proved with any particular formality. In Bane v. State,4 the
ciently to destroy its substantiality." Hefner, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
295.
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980) defines an "employee" as "an officer,
employee or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent
contractor." Therefore, the immunity may be difficult to establish if a public entity dele-
gates the responsibility for design review to an outside contractor and neglects to docu-
ment ultimate approval by a public entity body or employee. Such problems potentially
arise for a smaller city that contracts for design services from a county or outside engi-
neers, and any public entity which submits a design to state or federal agencies for re-
view and approval of the designs. In such cases, the defendant public entity may lack any
record that it independently approved the design.
The wording of section 830.6 leaves unclear whether the immunity would extend to a
public entity that acquires property from another public entity; for instance when a
newly incorporated city acquires roads and other improvements from a county. Arguably,
the city, as successor in interest to the county, becomes the beneficiary of any design
immunity that would have been available to the county. No case has decided this
question.
24. 208 Cal. App. 3d 860, 256 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1989).
court held that highway plans need not be actually signed by an en-
gineer so long as they are approved by an employee exercising dis-
cretionary authority.2 5 In the absence of local codes or administra-
tive regulations to the contrary, oral proof may suffice to establish
approval. "[S]ection 830.6 does not require that the approved plan
contain the signature of the preparer or the party approving the
plan. It is not the form of the plan or the form of the approval that is
critical to design immunity. 26
3.2 "Authority" to Approve
The second step in proving the element of discretionary approval is
to determine that the body or employee actually had the authority to
give the approval. Usually, state or municipal law will provide guid-
ance.27 For instance, most municipal codes specify the scope of au-
thority of city engineers, public works directors and other officials
likely to exercise discretionary authority.28 Further, codes may ex-
plicitly authorize such officers to delegate discretionary authority to
assistants. On this basis, in Thompson v. City of Glendale,29 the
court held that the director of public works for the City of Glendale
had delegated to the superintendent of maintenance the authority to
approve the design of a handrail.3 0
Once the public entity has verified the authority of the body or
employee who approved a plan, the public entity must also ensure
that the body or employee did not exceed their authority to evaluate
25. Id. at 868-69, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
26. Id. at 869, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (citing Thomson v. City of Glendale, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 378, 385, 132 Cal. Rptr. 52, 57 (1976)).
27. As stated in Johnston v. County of Yolo, 274 Cal. App. 2d 46, 52, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1969), "in the affairs of a public entity (e.g., a county, city or public
district) the locus of discretionary authority is fixed by law .... One looks to the law
fixing the public entity's internal distribution of powers to discern whether the legislative
body or, alternatively, some administrative board or officer exercises discretionary ap-
proval authority for the purpose of section 830.6." One would think that in every case,
the ultimate legislative body (City Council, Board of Supervisors, School Board, etc.)
would be vested with appropriate authority. In Johnston this analysis led to the conclu-
sion that a board of supervisors' approval of a roadway plan did not support the design
immunity because state law placed that decision in the hands of the county's road com-
missioner who, it so happened, disapproved of the plan.
28. E.g. City of Beverly Hills Municipal Code § 2-3.504(g) authorizes the city
transportation officer "[t]o plan, design, and construct the City's public works facilities
including storm drains, streets, alleys and sewers, and other facilities as may be required,
and is designated street Superintendent for purpose of the State Street and Highways
Code ....
29. 61 Cal. App. 3d 378, 384, 132 Cal. Rptr. 52, 56 (1976). The municipal code
section provided "whenever a power is granted or a duty is imposed upon a city officer by
this Code, or any other ordinance of the city, the power may be exercised or the duty
performed by an assistant or deputy of the officer or by a person authorized pursuant to
law by the officer, unless this Code expressly provides otherwise."
30. Id.
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the particular plan in question. For example, in Levin v. State,3 1 the
court held that, even though a state deputy highway engineer was
authorized to approve a state highway plan, he did not possess the
discretionary authority to disregard California Department of Trans-
portation standards which required the use of an eight foot shoulder
and guard rails.2 In the court's opinion, this omission did not involve
the exercise of discretion, because "there was no evidence that [he]
had discretionary authority to ignore the standards. '33
3.3 "Discretionary" Authority
The third step in proving the element of discretionary approval is
to establish that the approving body or employee exercised "discre-
tionary" authority. Section 830.6 merely refines the broad discretion-
ary immunity afforded to the federal and state governments under
the Federal Tort Claims Act3 4 and the California Tort Claims Act,35
especially the so-called "discretionary acts immunity" provided by
Government Code section 820.2.36 Generally, courts have concluded
that "discretion" under section 820.2 refers only to "basic policy de-
cisions."37 However, it is doubtful that this definition applies to the
minute details of highway and building designs that are the usual
subject of section 830.6. In practice, the courts apply a far less re-
strictive definition in design immunity cases. For instance, a mainte-
nance supervisor's approval of an informal "shop drawing" for a rail-
ing satisfied the requirement of approval by an employee exercising
discretionary authority in Thomson,38 and a state architect's decision
to use untreated rather than tempered glass was a sufficient exercise
of discretion to satisfy the immunity in Cabell v. State.9 These ex-
amples, involving relatively low level design decisions, suggest that
section 830.6 requires discretion only in the dictionary sense of exer-
cise of individual judgment.
Moreover, the body or employee exercising discretionary authority
31. 146 Cal. App. 3d 410, 194 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1983).
32. Id. at 418, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 228.
33. Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680(a).
35. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810-895.8 (West 1980).
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980).
37. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
248 (1968); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465,
11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (Johnson cites the Lipman holding that it is difficult to establish
a definite rule for government agency liability).
38. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 384-85, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
39. 67 Cal. 2d 150, 153-54, 430 P.2d 34, 36-37, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476, 478-79 (1967).
249
need not exercise expert judgment in approving a plan or design. As
observed in Thomson, section 830.6 contains no requirement that the
employee be either a licensed engineer or an architect.40 An early
case held that the design immunity requires approval in two capaci-
ties, an official act and, in many cases, a professional act.41 But re-
cent cases have emphasized that the body or employee's discretion-
ary approval embodies essentially an official act; the professional
aspect may be satisfied by the body's or employee's reliance upon the
expertise of engineers or architects who prepared the plan.42
3.4 "In Advance"
The fourth step in proving the element of discretionary approval is
to establish that the plan, design or standard was "approved in ad-
vance of construction or improvement. '43 This statutory requirement
presents some troublesome problems. One is that construction plans
are frequently modified after initial approval. Thus in Mozzetti v.
City of Brisbane," the design immunity failed because changes
made during construction deviated from the approved plan.
Another problem is that "as built" plans constitute a common
form of approval that the legislature probably did not consider when
it enacted section 830.6. If the public entity approves and accepts
completed construction pursuant to "as built" plans that deviate sig-
nificantly from the original plans, the public entity will have finally
approved the deviation only after the fact. In this situation, public
entities should argue that the legislative purpose is served when a
public entity approves the plan or design in advance of use, not liter-
ally in advance of construction as provided by the statute.
3.5 "Plan or Design" or "Standards"
The last step in proving the element of discretionary approval is to
establish the advance approval of the "plan or design" or, alterna-
tively, preparation of a plan or design in conformity with previously
approved "standards. 45
"Plan or Design"
In many cases, the meaning of "plan or design" leaves little to the
imagination because the public entity based its construction on
40. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
41. Johnston, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 54-55, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39.
42. Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks, 65 Cal. App. 3d 82, 89-90, 135 Cal. Rptr.
127, 130-31 (1976); Ramirez, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
44. 67 Cal. App. 3d 565, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1977).
45. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
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blueprints and accompanying written specifications that, taken to-
gether, clearly constitute a "plan or design." However, the legislative
history does not disclose why section 830.6 uses the words "plan or
design" in the disjunctive, and whether they are one and the same.
The dictionary definition of "plan" is broad; the meaning of "de-
sign" is even more inclusive.4
The Thomson court has interpreted "plan or design" to encompass
much more than professionally prepared blueprints; even an informal
shop drawing approved during the course of construction may suffice.
"There is no requirement that the design be expressed in any partic-
ular form. The plan need only be sufficiently explicit to assure that it
is understandable to the employee giving the approval. '4' No case
has explored the outer limits of the statutory language, and conceiv-
ably, it may extend to design decisions made verbally, or by mark-
ings on the construction site, so long as an employee with discretion-
ary authority gives approval in advance of actual construction.
However, the plan, design or standards are clearly limited to those
for "a construction of, or an improvement to, public property. ' 48
Therefore, the immunity does not embrace a plan or design in the
larger sense of operating procedures. In contrast, the somewhat par-
allel federal discretionary acts immunity for claims arising out of the
plan or design of public works projects extends to not only construc-
tion plans, but also the establishment of "schedules of operations."4
Often it is difficult to establish the requirement of a "plan or de-
sign," despite the existence of a full set of construction plans and
specifications. One problem is that plans may imply, rather than
specify, important aspects of construction. In an early and important
case interpreting section 830.6, Cameron v. State,5" the California
Supreme Court held that a geometric highway design which showed
the elevation of the center line of the road, but not the super-eleva-
tion of the roadway on curves, did not constitute a sufficient "plan or
design" to support the immunity in a case in which the plaintiff
46. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL WORLD DICTIONARY 1729 (1986)
defines "plan" in its most restrictive sense as "a drawing or a diagram on a plane;" but a
"design" is defined more broadly as "a mental project or scheme in which means to an
end are laid down." Id. at 611.
47. Thomson, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
48. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
49. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953). In Dalehite, the immunized
"plan" was an operating procedure that dictated the bagging of fertilizer at a high tem-
perature (a factor in the resulting fatal explosion) and the use of a specific label on the
bags (which failed to warn of the inflammable nature of the contents).
50. 7 Cal. 3d 318, 497 P.2d 777, 102 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
claimed that the improper super-elevation was a contributing cause
of the accident.5' The majority did not address the view, logically
expressed in the dissenting opinion, that given the geometric plan
and the center line elevation, traffic engineers could specify the
super-elevations from standard formulae and tables.52 Because de-
sign immunity is an affirmative defense upon which the public entity
has the burden of proof, public entities may have difficulty establish-
ing the details of a plan by implication.
A second problem in establishing the requirement of a "plan or
design" is that final construction may not actually conform to the
plan. It is helpful if public records contain "as built" plans approved
by a city engineer verifying that the completed construction con-
forms to the plans. In the absence of such records, it may be neces-
sary to have the important aspects of the improvement surveyed to
establish their conformity with the original plan.
Finally, there is the problem that many public properties, espe-
cially streets and highways, are not built on the basis of a single
"plan or design." Rather, they are an amalgam of modifications and
additions over the years. For example, the "plan or design" for an
intersection is seldom contained in one set of plans, and often con-
sists of a crazy-quilt of successive geometric designs, signing and
striping plans, overhead lighting designs, and the like. In some in-
stances, the public entity will succeed in splicing these together into
one "plan" to establish the immunity.5 3 However, the public entity
cannot establish the design immunity if some significant feature is
not shown on any set of plans; this problem is frequently encountered
in roadway design cases involving informally installed traffic regula-
tory signs and street markings.54 To ensure that a significant feature
is approved on a plan or design, the public entity's counsel or claims
administrator must carefully review the historical records in an ef-
fort to establish approvals of every aspect of the roadway in ques-
tion. This search may require review of engineering records, legisla-
tive body minutes, traffic commission minutes, the records of
independent architects, engineers and contractors, and in some cases,
antecedent county or state highway records.
51. Id. at 325-26, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
52. Id. at 330, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
53. See Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, 15 Cal. App. 3d 374, 93
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1971) (original roadway plus later modifications).
54. As stated in De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino, 16 Cal. App. 3d 739, 748,
94 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181 (1971): "[S]ince the City failed to show that the installation or
position of the stop sign was part of an approved design or plan of the intersection, it
failed to establish a fact crucial to the design or plan immunity."
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"Standards"
If a public entity cannot establish advance approval of a plan or
design, it may alternatively prove that the "plan or design is pre-
pared in conformity with standards previously so approved." 55 In
Hefner v. County of Sacramento,"8 the court recently construed this
language, and found that the design immunity applied to the place-
ment of a roadway limit line painted under the supervision of a sen-
ior traffic supervisor.5 Although plans did not exist, the supervisor
had discretionary authority to place limit lines pursuant to depart-
mental Standards, which required limit lines no less than four feet,
nor more than thirty feet from the nearest edge of the intersecting
street. Without discussion, the Hefner court assumed that a written
plan or design is unnecessary if the actual installation conforms with
previously approved standards. 58 Hefner provides an important basis
for establishing design immunity for the placement of traffic regula-
tory signs and pavement markings, even in the absence of a formal
plan or design.
In light of Hefner, public entities may be able to assert the design
immunity in connection with construction projects if the contract
documents contain or refer to standard specifications. Examples in-
clude the books of standard specifications for public works construc-
tion, which are published by larger counties, special state and federal
rules which may be incorporated into construction contracts (e.g.,
California Administrative Code Title 24, Architectural Barriers Law
and the Minimum Standards of the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development), building codes, and zoning codes.
4. Causation
The section 830.6 immunity applies only to an injury "caused by"
the plan or design.59 This requirement poses two problems of concur-
rent causation. The first arises when the plaintiff alleges that both
design and non-design features caused the accident. For instance, in
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.b (West 1980).
56. 197 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 243 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1988).
57. Id. at 1017, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
58. Id. at 1012-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94. In that case the standards consisted
of the County's adoption of the California Department of Transportation TRAFFIC MAN-
UAL and the United States Department of Commerce MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC
CONTROL DEVICES.
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
Flournoy v. State,60 a case involving the design of a bridge which
became dangerously icy in cold weather, the appellate court held
that even if the immunity barred plaintiffs from asserting an "active
negligence theory" (improper design of the bridge), they might pro-
ceed on an alternative "passive negligence theory" (failure to warn
of a known danger not readily apparent to a reasonably careful high-
way user).6' In language reminiscent of "concurrent causation" cases
involving liability insurance coverage,62 the Court noted that section
830.6 immunity is limited to a design-caused accident. The Flournay
court stated that the design immunity doctrine "does not immunize
from liability caused by negligence independent of design, even
though the independent negligence is only a concurring, proximate
cause of the accident.163 Because of this limitation on the design im-
munity, careful plaintiff's counsel should plead as many independent
contributing factors as reasonably possible. For instance, in a road-
way design case, the plaintiff might allege the existence of potholes,
debris or oil on a roadway surface, as well as improper design of the
roadway itself. But Ramirez,64 focusing on the design of a roadway
median strip, made short-shrift of the contention that the obstruction
of vision by shrubbery was a contributing factor to the dangerous
conditions. Noting that even plaintiff's experts opined that the shrub-
bery in and of itself was not the cause of the accident, but rather
was "only a factor" when considered in conjunction with the design
of the median, the court held that the case must stand or fall on the
question of the median design . 5 Although not clearly explaining the
basis for its decision, the court apparently meant that a concurring
cause must be truly "independent" in order to defeat the design
immunity.
The second causation problem arises when the public entity learns
that the approved plan or design is dangerous in operation, but fails
to correct or warn against the danger. Arguably, there are two inde-
pendent causes of an accident under these circumstances: One is the
public entity's negligence in approving the design, for which it is im-
mune under section 830.6; the other is the public entity's negligent
failure to protect the plaintiff from a known danger, for which there
is no immunity.6 6 Arguably, the design immunity would be com-
pletely eviscerated if plaintiff could circumvent it by simply alleging
60. 275 Cal. App. 2d 806, 811, 80 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1969).
61. Flournoy, id. at 811, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
62. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811
(1973).
63. Flournoy, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 811, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
64. Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach, 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 237 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1987).
65. Id. at 521, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
66. Flournoy, 275 Cal. App. 3d 806, 80 Cal. Rptr. 485.
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that the public entity failed to warn of the dangerous condition cre-
ated by the design. In Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks,67 the
court explicitly rejected this argument, and held that the public en-
tity loses the design immunity only if it has actual or constructive
notice that the roadway is dangerous in operation.68 The entire ques-
tion of failure to warn, once the defect is known, is now largely gov-
erned by Baldwin v. State of California"' and the California legisla-
ture's amendment of section 830.6 in 1979; both are discussed in the
next section.
5. Notice That The Plan Is Dangerous In Operation
5.1 The "Baldwin Doctrine"
Early cases construing section 830.6 held that once a public entity
constructed an improvement according to a plan, the design immu-
nity would apply perpetually, regardless of a history of accidents in
actual operation. 70 These decisions led to an absurd result inconsis-
tent with the broad concept of dangerous condition liability, ex-
pressed in Government Code section 835(b), which states that a pub-
lic entity will be liable for a dangerous condition of which it has
actual or constructive notice.7 1 In Baldwin, the California Supreme
Court abandoned its earlier position, and held that "[u]pon reconsid-
eration of this question, we are convinced that the Legislature did
not intend that public entities should be permitted to shut their eyes
to the operation of a plan or design once it has been transferred from
67. 65 Cal. App. 3d 82, 135 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1976).
68. Id. at 90-91, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32. The conclusion that constructive notice
will destroy the immunity is troublesome. In reversing summary judgment for the public
entity, Anderson noted that a roadway design flaw, consisting of a curve too sharp to
accommodate anticipated speeds, might be readily ascertainable from the plans them-
selves. This observation presents a conundrum: If the immunity applies because the plans
were "reasonably approved" how can the immunity be lost on the basis of "constructive
notice" that the plans were flawed. Anderson held that, to avoid constructive notice, the
public entity would have to demonstrate the hidden or inconspicuous nature of the defect.
Id. at 92, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 133. Therefore, Anderson would apply the immunity if the
defect were "hidden or inconspicuous," but permit an alternative theory of liability based
on failure to warn if a patent design defect provided constructive notice of the danger to
the public entity. Id.
69. 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1972).
70. Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967)
(state highway in existence since 1927); Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 60 Cal. Rptr
476 (1967) (repeated accidents involving untempered glass in door).
71. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835(b) (West 1980).
blueprint to blacktop. '7 2 In strong language, the court said:
Having approved the plan or design, the governmental agency may not, os-
trich-like, hide its head in the blueprints, blithely ignoring the actual opera-
tion of the plan. Once the entity has notice that the plan or design, under
changed physical conditions, has produced a dangerous condition of public
property, it must act reasonably to correct or alleviate the hazard.17 3
By changed physical conditions, the court meant, not only changes
to the roadway itself, but also changed traffic conditions. In Baldwin
traffic had doubled since construction of the roadway, and develop-
ment of surrounding property had altered traffic patterns. In observ-
ing that notice might be either actual or constructive, Baldwin pre-
pared the way for the subsequent decision in Anderson that defects
apparent on the face of a plan might provide sufficient constructive
notice to defeat the immunity.74
Baldwin implied that a combination of both "notice" and
"changed physical conditions" effectively dissolves the public entity
immunity. Accordingly, Ramirez subsequently held that the plaintiff
must prove both.7 5 However, more recently Bane held that the 1979
amendment to section 830.6 nullified the requirement of changed
physical conditions.76  As discussed below, Bane construed the
amendment to mean that the immunity is lost if the history of the
design in actual operation provides the public entity with notice of
the dangerous condition and the public entity has a sufficient period
of time to remedy it.
5.2 The 1979 Amendment to Section 830.6
In 1979, in the wake of Baldwin and Anderson, the California
Legislature amended section 830.6 for the express purpose of ex-
tending immunity until a public entity can remedy a design problem
that has come to its attention.7 7 The amendment provides in sub-
stance that "notwithstanding notice that constructed or improved
public property may no longer be in conformity with a plan, design
72. 6 Cal. 3d at 427, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
73. Id. at 434, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
74. See supra note 68.
75. Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach, 192 Cal. App. 3d 515, 527, 237 Cal. Rptr.
505, 513 (1987).
76. Bane v. State, 208 Cal. App. 3d 860, 871, 256 Cal. Rptr. 468, 474-75 (1989).
The 1979 amendment is underscored in the appendix to this Article.
77. The Legislative Counsel's Digest to AB 893, 79-80 Sess., (Mar. 15, 1979)
(Knox), stated:
This bill would extend the immunity for injuries in cases where the public
property no longer conforms to the plans or designs of a governmental body, to
allow such a body to remedy the property and bring it within the specifications
of the plans or designs. In the event the governmental body is unable to remedy
the public property, this bill would extend the immunity for so long as neces-
sary, provided it provides warnings of the defects in the property.
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or standard which reasonably could be approved," the immunity
shall continue for a reasonable period of time sufficient to permit the
public entity to obtain funds to carry out remedial work necessary to
correct the design defect. If the public entity is unable to remedy the
dangerous condition because of "practical impossibility" or lack of
funds, the immunity will remain in effect so long as the public entity
"shall reasonably attempt" to provide adequate warnings.78
It is difficult to unravel the statutory interpretation problems
posed by the 1979 Amendment. Interpreted literally, the amendment
does not define the circumstances under which the design immunity
is lost; rather, it specifies the circumstances under which it may be
retained. It is unclear what the legislature meant by "public prop-
erty [that] may no longer be in conformity with a plan ... which
could be reasonably approved." Does this phrase refer to construc-
tion that has deviated from the original design?79 Or does it refer to
the obsolescence of the original design under present design stan-
dards? Bane, the only case to deal with the 1979 amendment, side-
stepped the pitfalls of semantic interpretation, and simply held that,
although the 1979 amendment to section 830.6 could have been drafted
with more clarity, a reasonable, common sense interpretation of the quoted
language is that once the public entity has actual or constructive notice that
its property may no longer be in conformity with a reasonable design or
plan, the immunity nonetheless will continue for a reasonable period of time
to allow the entity to obtain funds and to carry out remedial work to bring
the property into conformity with the reasonable design or plan." 80
In other words, once the public entity is on notice that its design has
produced a dangerous condition, the immunity continues only for a
reasonable time to allow the public entity to acquire funds and cor-
rect the dangerous condition. Consequently, Bane abolished any re-
quirement under Baldwin that a plaintiff must show both notice and
changed physical conditions to defeat the immunity.
Once the plaintiff has alleged that the public entity is on notice
that the original design has produced a dangerous condition, the
public entity has the burden of proving that the immunity remains in
effect.8 However, neither the 1979 amendment nor Bane specified
the evidentiary standard for determining whether the original con-
struction still conforms to a plan that could be reasonably approved.
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
79. Certainly, this is the thrust of the material in the Legislative Counsel's Digest,
quoted in supra note 53.
80. Bane, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
81. Baldwin, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 439, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145, 155 (1972).
Logically, the substantial evidence test, which applies to the reasona-
bleness of the original approval, should also apply to determine
whether the construction still conforms to a reasonable plan or de-
sign. The legislative policy in favor of initially immunizing the de-
sign of public improvements - insulating governmental design deci-
sions from review by juries82 is equally applicable to a governmental
decision to continue to use an improvement without modification.
The 1979 amendment further provides that if a public entity lacks
funds to bring the construction into conformity with a reasonable
plan, the immunity remains in effect so long as the public entity
"shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings. ' '8 3 This pro-
vision seemingly paralleled existing section 835.4, which may absolve
a public entity from liability if the practicability and cost of protect-
ing against a risk outweighs the probability and gravity of potential
injury to the public. 8 4 The defense of insufficient funds is a touchy
subject, difficult to prove, and easily circumvented by evidence that
warning signs would have sufficed if the public entity could not af-
ford heavy capital expenditures. The amendment's provision that the
immunity shall remain in effect so long as the public entity shall
reasonably "attempt" to provide adequate warnings involves a curi-
ous choice of words.85 An attempted warning might fall short of an
adequate warning, but it is doubtful that the appellate courts would
extend the immunity to cases in which warnings are inadequate.
6. Procedure
Design immunity is an affirmative defense that the public entity
must plead in its answer, and prove at trial. 86 However, the public
entity will be relieved of the obligation to affirmatively plead the de-
fense if the complaint alleges dangerous condition liability, but fails
to fairly inform the defendant that negligent design is an issue in the
case.
87
As mentioned, the unique aspect of design immunity is that "sub-
stantial evidence" of reasonable approval is determined by a judge,
82. See supra section 2.2.
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 860.5 (West 1980).
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4 (West 1980).
85. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary posed the following question regarding
the proposed 1979 amendment: "Should not the public entity be required to provide ade-
quate warnings, rather than merely attempt to provide them?" Senate Committee on
Judiciary, Comment, AB 893, 79-80 Sess. (May 31, 1989) (Knox) at 3. Apparently this
question went unanswered and the Senate approved the Bill without change.
86. Hilts v. County of Solano, 265 Cal. App. 2d 161, 175, 71 Cal. Rptr. 275, 285
(1968).
87. Strongman v. County of Kern, 255 Cal. App. 2d 308, 311, 62 Cal. Rptr. 908,
911 (1967).
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not a jury.88 Because "reasonableness" is an issue of law for the
court, the public entity will typically present the defense by a motion
for summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. A motion for summary judgment pursuant to Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,89 is the preferred ap-
proach because it avoids a jury trial on the main liability and
damage issues of the case.
In a motion for summary judgment based on the design immunity,
to fulfill the required elements of proof, the public entity should pre-
sent: (1) authentication of a plan approved prior to construction by a
legislative body or employee exercising discretionary authority, 90 (2)
"as-built" plans or a surveyor's declaration that the improvement
was constructed according to plan, (3) an architect or engineer's dec-
laration expressing an expert opinion that the plan could have been
reasonably approved, (4) declarations of public officials denying any
notice of the alleged danger or change of conditions, and (5) ex-
cerpts from plaintiff's complaint, interrogatory answers or deposition
testimony showing that the plan was the alleged cause of the
accident.91
Because the "substantial evidence" test enables public entities to
obtain summary adjudication of reasonableness with relative ease,
plaintiffs' counsel must emphasize other aspects of their case in or-
der to circumvent the design immunity. Prudence requires pleading
that non-design features contributed to the plaintiff's injuries; and
arguing that the immunity has dissipated because of notice of the
danger and changed conditions. In opposing a public entity's motion
for summary judgment, plaintiffs counsel should argue that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard applies to all elements of the
immunity other than reasonableness, and that triable issues of mate-
88. Johnston v. County of Yolo, 274 Cal. App. 2d 46, 56, 79 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40
(1969); Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967); Hilts
v. County of Solano, 265 Cal. App. 2d 161, 71 Cal. Rptr. 275. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
90. The passage of time can complicate proof of the plan and approval. However
the public entity can utilize the "Official Records and Recorded Writings" provisions of
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1530-32 to authenticate public records and prove their contents.
One case has suggested, but did not decide, that a public entity might judicially notice
legislative or administrative approval of plans. Hilts v. County of Solano, 265 Cal. App.
2d at 175-76 n.6, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 286 n.6 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 451-59).
91. The findings of fact and conclusions of law quoted in Thomson v. City of Glen-
dale, 61 Cal. App. 3d 378, 382-83, 132 Cal. Rptr. 52, 55-56 (1976), provides practition-
ers with a concise outline for the presentation of a motion for summary judgment on
design immunity.
rial fact remain as to those elements. Public entities can lose motions
for summary judgment because of vexing technical problems in con-
clusively proving the existence of the plan, the approval, discretion-
ary authority to approve, conformity of the improvement to the plan,
and causation. Accordingly, if appropriate, plaintiff's counsel can re-
quire exact proof of each of the elements required to sustain a sum-
mary judgment motion.
A recent amendment to the summary judgment statute has cur-
tailed its usefulness in establishing design immunity in cases where
the plaintiff alleges that both design and non-design features contrib-
uted to the injury., Formerly, section 437c(f) permitted summary ad-
judication "as to some but not all of the issues of the action. 92 On
this basis the public entity could move for summary adjudication of
the design immunity defense - an "issue" within the meaning of
the statute - even if the motion did not resolve the non-design fea-
tures of the case. As amended, effective January 1, 1991, section
437c(f) allows summary adjudication only as to an entire "cause of
action."93 Consequently, if a cause of action for dangerous condition
liability alleges both design and non-design features, the presence of
a triable issue of fact on non-design features may thwart summary
adjudication of the design immunity defense.
If non-design features prevent a public entity from obtaining sum-
mary judgment, the public entity may alternatively move for an or-
der under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 598'4 that the
trial of the design immunity issue shall precede the trial of the rest
of the case. Unlike the recently amended summary judgment statute,
section 598 still permits trial on "any issue or any part thereof. 9 5
This maneuver may be particularly appealing if the trial judge con-
cludes that the immunity issue - and perhaps the entire case - can
be resolved in a court trial. Once the public entity establishes the
design immunity defense, the court must instruct the jury that the
public entity is immune as a matter of law for design related dam-
ages. At that point, the trial may proceed on any remaining non-
design issues.98
CONCLUSION
The design immunity under California Government Code section
830.6 has undergone extensive judicial and legislative modification
since its enactment in 1963. Expanded at one end by liberal applica-
92. CAL. CIv. CODE § 437c (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
93. CAL. CIv. CODE § 437c(f) (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
94. CAL. CIv. CODE § 598 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991).
95. Id.
96. Muffett v. Royster, 147 Cal. App. 3d 289, 306, 195 Cal. Rptr. 73, 73 (1983);
Mozzetti v. City of Bristane, 67 Cal. App. 3d 565, 573, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751, 755 (1977).
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tion of the "substantial evidence" test and whittled down at the
other by the doctrine of notice and changed conditions, design im-
munity remains a formidable defense. Summary judgment on the de-
sign immunity may resolve the whole case; alternatively, a public
entity that successfully asserts this defense at trial may obtain a jury
instruction eliminating design as a basis for dangerous condition lia-
bility. Although the complaint may proceed to trial on any non-de-
sign elements that have been alleged as a basis for liability, fre-
quently the allegations of defective design constitute the real
substance of the case; the court's decision on the design immunity
issue may well determine the outcome of the case as a practical
matter.
APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 830.6 [Approved plan or de-
sign of public property; remedial work; adequate warnings]:
"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this
chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction
of, or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design
has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by
the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or
employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or
where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards
previously so approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that
there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a rea-
sonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or
the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other
body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the
standards therefor. Notwithstanding notice that constructed or im-
proved public property may no longer be in conformity with a plan
or design or a standard which reasonably could be approved by the
legislative body or other body or employee, the immunity provided
by this section shall continue for a reasonable period of time suffi-
cient to permit the public entity to obtain funds for and carry out
remedial work necessary to allow such public property to be in con-
formity with a plan or design approved by the legislative body of
the public entity or other body or employee, or with a plan or de-
sign in conformity with a standard previously approved by such leg-
islative body or other body or employee. In the event that the public
entity is unable to remedy such public property because of practical
impossibility or lack of sufficient funds, the immunity provided by
this section shall remain so long as such public entity shall reasona-
bly attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of the
condition not conforming to the approved plan or design or to the
approved standard. However, where a person fails to heed such
warning or occupies public property despite such warning, such fail-
ure or occupation shall not in itself constitute an assumption of risk
of the danger indicated by the warning." (Amended by Stats 1979,
ch 481, §1.)
NOTE: The original statute was enacted in 1963. The 1979 amend-
ment is italicized.
